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AN OVERVIEW OF THE EARTH SCIENCE AFTERNOON CONSTELLATION 
CONTINGENCY PROCEDURES 
Karen V. Richon 
Warren Case 
The Earth Science Afternoon Constellation comprises NASA missions Aqua, 
Aura, CloudSat and the Orbiting Carbon Observatory (OCO), the joint 
NASNCNES mission CALIPSO and the CNES mission PARASOL. Both NASA 
and CNES offices are responsible for ensuring that contingency plans or other 
arrangements exist to cope with contingencies within their respective jurisdictions 
until the conclusion of all Afternoon Constellation operations. The Mission 
Operations Working Group, comprised of members from each of the missions, 
has developed the high-level procedures for maintaining the safety of this 
constellation. Each contingency situation requires detailed analyses before any 
decisions are made. This paper describes these procedures, and includes 
defining what constitutes a contingency situation, the pertinent parameters 
involved in the contingency analysis and guidelines for the actions required, 
based on the results of the contingency analyses. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Earth Science Afternoon Constellation (AC) comprises the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA) missions Aqua, Aura, Cloudsat, and the Orbiting 
Carbon Observatory (OCO), the joint NASA/ Centre National D’Etudes Spatiales 
(CNES) mission Cloud Aerosol Lidar and Infrared Pathfinder Satellite Observations 
(CALIPSO), and the CNES mission Polarization and Anisotropy of Reflectances for 
Atmospheric Science Coupled with Observations from a Lidar (PARASOL). Aqua, Aura 
and PARASOL are on-orbit while CALIPSO and CloudSat will be launched in late 2005. 
OCO will be launched in 2008. The AC is required to develop contingency plans and 
procedures in accordance with NPD 8621 .I G NASA Mishap Reporting and 
Investigating Policy to maintain the safety and health of all members of the 
constellation. Both NASA and CNES offices are responsible for ensuring that 
contingency plans or other arrangements exist to cope with AC contingencies within 
their respective jurisdictions until the conclusion of AC operations. 
The Afternoon Constellation, composed of six dissimilar satellites flying in close 
proximity requires a more complex coordination and examination of contingency 
scenarios than is normally required for constellation missions. The fact that all six 
satellites are unique, that their launch dates span years and different launch vehicles 
increases the complexity of the system as a whole. To ensure the safety and success of 
these missions, coordination of the flight dynamics activities during mission planning 
and mission operations is critical. The Earth Science Mission Operations (ESMO) Office 
at Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) has helped to facilitate the coordination of 
activities between these missions by establishing a Mission Operations Working Group 
(MOWG) and by developing the Constellation Coordination System (CCS). The AC 
MOWG coordinates planning and issues relating to the constellation as a whole and has 
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been the forum for developing the operations concept and contingency procedures for 
the Afternoon Constellation. 
This paper describes these high-level procedures for maintaining the safety of this 
constellation. It includes defining what constitutes a contingency situation, the pertinent 
parameters involved in the contingency analysis and guidelines for the actions required, 
based on the results of the contingency analyses. Contingencies discussed are 
primarily concerned with avoiding collisions; therefore the key parameters for any action 
plan are the close approach miss distances and the time remaining before closest 
approach occurs. Each contingency situation requires detailed analyses before any 
decisions are made. 
BACKGROUND 
The AC satellites fly in similar near-circular, sun-synchronous, repeating ground track 
orbits at approximately 705-km mean equatorial altitude. This configuration allows their 
instruments to take simultaneous and near-simultaneous measurements of the Earth's 
surface, oceans, and atmosphere. 
Concept of the Control Box 
The AC configuration schematic in Figure 1 shows the along-track separation of the 
satellites in terms of Control Boxes. The Control Box is a theoretical construct centered 
at some reference position on a satellite's drag-free orbit with dimensions defined by an 
allowable along-track movement relative to the box's center (the reference position). 
Underlying the Control Box is the Worldwide Reference System -2 (WRS-2) which 
establishes the reference ground track. In practice, the along-track movement is 
coupled with an East-West movement of the satellite's ground-track relative to the 
idealized ground-track of the drag-free orbit. It is this limitation in both the along-track 
and cross-track movements that creates the notion of a two-dimensional "box". 
The Control Box construct was established originally to address science requirements, 
that is, to maintain optimal spacing of satellites to maximize science returns without 
requiring a great deal of active coordination between satellite operations Control 
Centers. If a satellite stays within its own Control Box, it should never create a collision 
risk to any other satellite. The Control Box can be used to provide an "early warning" if 
a satellite leaves its designated area and potentially threatens another satellite. 
As can be seen in Figure 1 , the Aqua, CALIPSO, and PARASOL all maintain Control 
Boxes that are .+_ 10 kilometers measured along the equator at the descending node 
(corresponding to & 21.5 seconds in equator crossing time), while Aura's Control Box is 
k 20 kilometers measured along the equator at the descending node (corresponding to * 43 seconds in equator crossing time). OCO plans to maintain a much larger Control 
Box, +/- 107.5 seconds at the front of the constellation. CloudSat represents a special 
case in that it will fly in formation with CALIPSO at a spacing of 12.5 a . 5  seconds in the 
direction of Aqua. Even though OCO will be flying at the front of the AC, Aqua is 
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considered the lead satellite of the AC, since all AC missions fly in constellation with 
Aqua. 
m 6 m 5  
Figure 1 - Baseline Afternoon Constellation Orbit Configuration 
Satellites will move in a predictable fashion within their Control Boxes (Figure 2). This 
motion is called a circulation orbit and represents the relative motion of each satellite to 
its Control Box. At its mean semi-major axis (SMA) altitude, the satellite traces the 
correct ground track. Aerodynamic drag slows the satellite, dropping its altitude, 
thereby making the satellite speed up relative to its “fixed” Control Box. Eventually, the 
satellite needs to perform an orbit-raising maneuver in order to stay within its box. This 
moves the satellite above its mean SMA altitude, so that it is slower than the Control 
Box. Drag takes over, forcing the satellite to lower its orbit and then the cycle repeats. 
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Figure 2 - Control Box / Circulation Orbit Relationship 
Orbital 
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Figure 3 shows the special case of CloudSat flying in formation with CALIPSO. Though 
there is a 30-second buffer between the CALIPSO and Aqua Control Boxes, the 
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CloudSat satellite can be as close as 15 seconds to the trailing edge of Aqua's Control 
Box. 
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Figure 3 - CloudSatKALIPSO Formation Flying 
The Zone of Exclusion Concept 
The AC Zone of Exclusion (ZOE) shown in Figure 4 is defined as a rectangular region in 
a satellite radial, in-track, cross-track (RIC) coordinate system centered on each of the 
AC satellites. 
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Figure 4 -Zone of Exclusion 
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For the AC, two ZOEs have been defined as shown in Figure 5: the Alert ZOE and the 
Action ZOE. The dimensions of each ZOE are shown in Table 1. These dimensions 
are based on parameters used for the International Space Station for debris avoidance, 
not through a specific study of possible values for the AC. 
V 
Nadir 
(towards Earth) 
Figure 5 -ZOE Relationships 
Table 1 -Zone of Exclusion Dimensions 
ZOE Cross-track 
This 2-tier ZOE structure reflects the difference in concern in the two volumes. For 
example, a satellite that is just inside the Alert ZOE does not present an immediate 
danger, whereas a satellite that enters an Action ZOE is cause for action. 
The Alert ZOE is used to provide notifications to affected missions of a potential 
close approach. Predicted entry into this region is cause for concern, but not 
necessarily immediate reaction. The Alert ZOE defines a "keep-out" or "no-go" zone 
for other satellites. A close approach between two Constellation satellites inside a 
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ZOE may be considered unsafe by representing an unacceptable level of risk of 
collision. Orbit prediction tools used by the AC are accurate enough, even including 
uncertainties, that if the Alert ZOEs are honored during maneuver design there is no 
chance of collision with another satellite. 
An Action ZOE violation signifies an unacceptably high risk of a collision and is to be 
avoided, if possible, by use of an evasive maneuver. If an Action ZOE violation is 
predicted to occur, the functioning satellite is required to take immediate action. 
When a functioning satellite maneuvers in order to pass above (or below) another 
satellite in the Constellation it shall due so in a manner such that neither satellite's 
Action ZOE is violated (taking into account 3 sigma errors in orbit determination and 
maneuver execution). 
The Constellation Coordination System 
The NASA Earth Science Mission Operations office has developed the Constellation 
Coordination System (CCS) to assist in the critical coordination of flight dynamics 
activities during mission planning and mission operations and AC contingency 
situations. The CCS is a collection of tools that enables flight dynamics data exchange 
and facilitates communications among the Control Centers of the missions of the 
Afternoon Constellation. The main capabilities of the CCS include acquisition and 
delivery of mission data products, access to tools for on-line flight dynamics analysis, 
performing automatic analyses for constellation health and safety monitoring, and 
notification of constellation status changes. The CCS functions performed in the context 
of AC contingencies will be described below. 
Contingency Situations in the Context of the Afternoon Constellation 
A contingency situation is defined as any mission-related failure, mishap or incident 
(involving flight or test hardware, support equipment, or facilities) that significantly 
delays or jeopardizes a mission, or prevents accomplishment of a major scientific 
objective. An anomaly is an unplanned deviation from normal spacecraft operations, 
such as a satellite entering safehold and being unable to control its orbit. Loss of orbit 
control is a serious anomaly because the satellite can not control its position within the 
Constellation. The Flight Operations Team (FOT) will restore the spacecraft as quickly 
as possible to its normal operating state, but the severity of the anomaly may cause a 
long delay. 
The MOWG has defined a credible AC contingency situation as a circumstance or 
condition within the constellation whereby a spacecraft is in a safe-hold condition and 
has drifted outside of its Control Box. This contingency situation is "contingent" on a 
prolonged safe-hold having occurred and can escalate in severity to the point of a 
potential collision between member satellites. With uncorrected drifting, eventually one 
satellite can make an unplanned close approach to another unless an evasive 
maneuver is performed. Such a contingency requires a coordinated action plan be 
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established before the event, with actions defined and agreed upon beforehand for both 
affected satellites. 
Most, but not all of the identified contingency situations described below involve one 
functioning satellite being threatened by a non-functioning satellite, so it is useful to 
provide an overview of this generic situation before getting into more specific scenarios. 
In this context, a functioning satellite has the propulsive capability to change its orbit, 
while a non-functioning satellite (Le., in safe-hold) does not. 
AC CONTINGENCY PROCEDURE OVERVIEW 
The MOWG has defined a generic approach to contingency situations which can be 
extended to all scenarios examined, including those not involving potential collisions. 
Execution of a contingency procedure may go through several stages, with each 
successive stage representing an escalation in the contingency: 
0 Monitoring and Detection 
0 Analysis 
Notification and Coordination 
Maneuvers 
Monitoring and Detection 
Monitoring is performed through two primary methods: 
Each Control Center monitors the position of its satellite. 
0 Each Control Center provides ephemerides on a daily basis .J the CCS tool. At 
the receipt of the ephemeris files, CCS automatically performs its analyses of 
orbital positions of all satellites. 
Using the position data, both the Control Center and the CCS determine: 
Is the satellite still in its Control Box? 
Will it remain in its Control Box for the span of the predictive ephemeris? 
Analysis 
If any satellite has left (or is predicted to leave) its Control Box, the CCS will 
automatically perform additional analyses to determine the likelihood that the satellite 
will endanger any other. 
The results of these analyses will include the following: 
0 When did/will the satellite leave its Control Box? 
0 Will the satellite enter the Control Box of another satellite and if so, when? 
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0 Will the satellite enter the ZOE of another satellite and if so, when? 
0 What will be the “miss distance” at closest approach? 
Notification and Coordination 
Coordination starts with the satellite operations teams in each Control Center. Clearly, 
each Control Center will be fully aware of an impending contingency situation caused by 
its own satellite. One of the main purposes of the CCS is to supplement this by alerting 
a team via e-mail that its satellite may be threatened by the approach of another 
satellite. This notification also is emailed to the NASA Constellation Manager (CM). 
Regardless of how a potential contingency is detected, the notification to the affected 
Control Centers is handled in the following manner. If a Control Center becomes aware 
of a potential contingency situation, whether through its own analysis or through the 
analysis of the CCS, it notifies the affected Control Center(s) directly through e-mail 
and/or telephone. Notification is provided at the same time to the NASA CM. 
Depending on the criticality of the contingency, the satellite’s team will set various status 
flags within CCS to provide notification to the CCS user community. 
The affected teams will coordinate their actions in accordance with the AC Operations 
Coordination Plan (ACOCP) procedures. The Control Centers maintain communication 
throughout the period of contingency and corrective measures with each other and the 
NASA CM. 
Maneuvers 
First and foremost, the goal of this coordination shall be to return each satellite to its 
Control Box. The satellite that left (or will leave) its Control Box has the prime 
responsibility to make correctional maneuvers and return to its Control Box. 
If this is not possible, steps shall be taken by the other satellites to ensure that potential 
close approaches and/or collisions are avoided at all costs. If the drifting satellite has 
no orbital control, the responsibility for self-preservation falls upon the threatened 
satellite(s). The threatened satellite(s) shall execute evasive maneuvers to prevent 
unacceptably close approaches with any other satellite. 
If any of these maneuvers cause additional satellites to leave their Control Boxes, an 
action plan shall be identified to either return all functioning satellites to their Control 
Boxes once the danger has passed, or if necessary, seek approval to change the AC 
configuration. A configuration change is not to be approached lightly since this may 
cause additional science and operational concerns. The MOWG is the governing body 
in such decisions. 
Most potential contingency situations involve one satellite lacking orbital control, call it 
Satellite B (think “Broken”) that is approaching a functioning satellite, call this one 
Satellite A (think “A-OK) (see Figure 6). If Satellite B remains without orbital control, it 
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will drift and may eventually threaten Satellite A. Satellite A may need to make 
maneuvers to avoid Satellite B. Debris from a collision could pose a risk for the entire 
Constellation. 
Simple 
Return 
Complex 
Return 
Satellite B Satellite A 
Control Box Control Box 
I 
I 
I 
Satellite B 
Control Box 
Satellite A 
Control Box 
1111111 111111 t 
Figure 6 - Cdllision Avoidance Scenario with Satellite A and Satellite B 
AFTERNOON CONSTELLATION CONTINGENCY SCENARIOS 
Several specific contingency scenarios have been identified for the AC. Analysis of 
each specific contingency situation is critical to establish a timeline when actions (e.g., 
evasive maneuvers) must be performed. Each of the identified scenarios is discussed 
below. 
Aqua in a Prolonged Safe-Hold 
Aqua is located at the “front” of the AC (until the launch of OCO). A prolonged safe-hold 
which prevents orbit maneuvering will cause it to drift forward, as shown in Figure 7. 
Because it will move away from the rest of the Constellation it will not pose a threat to 
any satellite other than OCO. This threat to OCO is minimal due to the large separation 
of the two satellites. It will take several weeks for Aqua to drift to the vicinity of OCO, 
allowing plenty of time to react using the standard collision avoidance procedure 
described above, with Aqua as Satellite B and OCO as Satellite A. 
A separate issue for the Constellation will be the loss of the Aqua satellite and 
instruments for science coordination. Also, the role of Constellation “lead” will need to 
be reassigned. 
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Figure 7 - Collision Avoidance Scenario between Aqua and OCO 
CloudSat in a Prolonged Safe-Hold 
If CloudSat remains in a prolonged safe-hold, it will drift and eventually may enter 
CALIPSO’s Alert ZOE (see Figure 8). 
ontrol Box <pTuds/ 
Control Box 
I 
Orbital 
motion 
CloudSat is non-functioning 
Moving towards CALIPSO 
Figure 8 - Collision Avoidance Scenario between CloudSat and CALIPSO 
CloudSat nominally moves along its circulation orbit in 13 to 50 days (depending on the 
level of atmospheric drag). As such, the “worst-case” scenarios addressed below may 
be favorably biased by up to 13-50 days, depending on where in the circulation orbit the 
safe-hold occurs. The close approach may or may not be considered threatening, 
depending on the distance between the satellites. 
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Under the highest recorded atmospheric drag while at the worst location: 
0 CloudSat will enter CALIPSO’s Alert ZOE in about 5 days 
0 A CloudSat close approach with CALIPSO will occur in about 7 days. 
Under typical atmospheric drag while at the worst location: 
0 CloudSat will enter CALIPSO’s Alert ZOE in about 11 days 
0 A CloudSat close approach with CALIPSO will occur in about 17 days. 
The standard collision avoidance procedure will be followed to ensure that there is no 
unacceptable close approach between CloudSat (as Satellite B) and CALIPSO (as 
Satellite A). 
PARASOL in a Prolonged Safe-Hold 
If PARASOL remains in a prolonged safe-hold, it will drift and may eventually enter 
CALIPSO’s Alert ZOE (see Figure 9). 
Control Box Control Box 
, , 
I I 
. ; - \  
Orbital 
motion 
PARASOL 
Non-functioning 
Moving towards CALIPSO 
CALIPSO 
Figure 9 - Collision Avoidance Scenario between PARASOL and CALIPSO 
Several days or weeks are expected to elapse before PARASOL drifts sufficiently to 
threaten CALIPSO. The standard collision avoidance procedure will be followed to 
ensure that there is no unacceptable close approach between PARASOL (as Satellite 
B) and CALIPSO (as Satellite A). 
Aura in a Prolonged Safe-Hold 
If Aura remains in a prolonged safe-hold, it will drift and may eventually enter 
PARASOL’S Alert ZOE (see Figure IO) .  
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If Aura begins to drift, it will move closer to the PARASOL satellite. It will take several 
weeks for Aura to drift to the vicinity of PARASOL, allowing plenty of time to react using 
the standard collision avoidance procedure. 
Control Box Control Box 
I t 
Orbital 
motion 
Aura PARASOL 
Non-functioning 
Moving towards PARASOL 
Figure 10 - Collision Avoidance Scenario between Aura and PARASOL 
OCOin a ProlongedSafe-Hold 
If OCO remains in a prolonged safe-hold, it will drift and eventually leave the AC (see 
Figure 11). 
Morning 
Control Box Constellation - 
Orbital 
motion 
I-------- 
OCO 
Non-functioning 
Moving away from the 
Afternoon Constellation 
Figure 11 - Collision Avoidance Scenario Involving OCO 
Since OCO will be a large distance in front of the rest of the Constellation, it should 
pose no immediate danger if it loses orbital control. Close approach analysis with the 
Earth Science Morning Constellation shall be performed to minimize the slight risk of 
OCO drifting within allowable Morning Constellation satellite ZOEs. 
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CALIPSO in A Prolonged Safe-Hold 
If CALIPSO remains in a prolonged safe-hold and has lost orbital control, it will drift and 
eventually enter Aqua’s Alert ZOE. This scenario differs from the earlier ones in that if 
the formation is maintained, this drifting motion will force CloudSat into Aqua’s Alert 
ZOE as well (see Figure 12). 
Control Box Control Box  
at 
CALIPSO is non-functioning 
Moving towards Aqua 
Pushing CloudSat towards Aqua 
Control Box 
Orbital 
motion 
Figure 12 - CALIPSO in Prolonged Safe-Hold 
CALIPSO nominally moves along its circulation orbit in 35 to 130 days (depending on 
the level of atmospheric drag). As such, the “worst-case” scenarios addressed below 
may be favorably biased by up to 35-130 days, depending on where in the circulation 
orbit the safe-hold occurs. 
A second variable is the location of Aqua during this safe-hold. This can greatly 
influence whether/when a close approach will occur. 
A final complication is the position of Cloudsat. If CloudSat maintains its formation with 
a CALIPSO in safe-hold, it will be forced into Aqua’s Control Box and Alert ZOE. Under 
these circumstances, CloudSat is allowed to enter Aqua’s Control Box, but is to 
maneuver (a) before it enters Aqua’s Alert ZOE and (b) at least 4 days before closest 
approach with Aqua, whichever comes first. 
Under the highest recorded atmospheric drag while at the worst locations and if no 
actions are taken: 
a) CALIPSO will leave its Control Box in 0.4 days 
b) CloudSat will be forced into Aqua’s Control Box in 3.3 days 
c) CALIPSO will enter Aqua’s Control Box in 6 days 
d) A CALIPSO close approach with Aqua will occur in about 9 days. 
Under typical atmospheric drag while at the worst location and if no actions are taken: 
a) CALIPSO will leave its Control Box in 1 day 
b) CloudSat will be forced into Aqua’s Control Box in 11 days 
c) CALIPSO will enter Aqua’s Control Box in 14 days 
d) A CALIPSO close approach with Aqua will occur in about 21 days 
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Drag Makeup Maneuver Too Large - Missions Having Retrograde Capability (Applicable 
to CloudSat, CALIPSO, PARASOL, and OCO) 
If a satellite executes an orbit-raising maneuver that exceeds its target to the extent that 
the satellite will leave its Control Box and places another constellation satellite at risk, a 
corrective maneuver will be required for missions that have retrograde maneuver 
capability (see Figure 13). 
Control Box 
Figure 13 - Drag Makeup Maneuver Too Large 
(Retrograde maneuver capability available) 
It is desirable for the satellite to correct its orbital position early by performing a 
retrograde burn, before it can stray near any other satellites in the Constellation. The 
urgency of a retrograde maneuver will depend on the magnitude of the over-burn. 
Drag Makeup Maneuver Too Large - Missions without Retrograde Capability (Applies to 
Aqua and Aura) 
If a satellite executes an orbit-raising maneuver that exceeds its target to the extent that 
the satellite will leave its Control Box, a corrective maneuver would be desired, but will 
not be possible for missions lacking retrograde maneuver capability, i.e., Aqua and Aura 
(see Figure 14). 
Since no retrograde maneuver capability exists for Aqua or Aura, they will be forced to 
wait until their semi-major axis has decreased from the effects of drag before they can 
execute a corrective orbit-raising maneuver. Depending on the extent of the over burn, 
this could place other satellites in jeopardy. The contingency situation could escalate 
into a standard Satellite NSatellite B collision avoidance scenario, except that both 
satellites retain propulsive capability. The prime responsibility to rectify this situation 
rests with the satellite that performed the over burn (i.e., Satellite B), but other satellites 
may offer to perform evasive maneuvers, at their discretion. 
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Figure 14 - Drag Makeup Maneuver Too Large 
(No Retrograde maneuver capability available) 
Approved Control Box Violations 
For efficient operations, a satellite may find it advantageous to leave its Control Box for 
a short period (i.e., a few days). Planned Control Box excursions (Figure 15) can be 
submitted for approval to the Constellation Manager and the MOWG if and only if the 
following conditions are satisfied: 
0 The satellite retains full capability to perform propulsive maneuvers 
The excursion shall not endanger any other satellite; in particular, the planned 
excursion shall not go past the halfway point into the buffer zone between it 
and the nearest satellite 
0 The excursion provides advantages to the satellite's operations 
0 The excursion shall not dramatically impact correlated science observations 
with any other AC (unless approval was received from that science team) 
0 Notice is provided to all AC teams at least 5 days prior to the Control Box 
violation. 
Buffer 
midpoint 
I 
Satel I ite I 
I 
Control Box 
I 
Satel lite 
Figure 15 - Satellite B Executing a Planned Control Box Excursion 
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Once a satellite team has received concurrence that its satellite, Satellite B in Figure 15, 
is allowed to leave its own Control Box on an anticipated excursion, the standard 
procedure for performing drag makeup maneuvers will be followed. The CCS will 
continue the automated control box and ZOE violation automated calculations during 
the excursion period and will notify the satellite team and the Constellation Manager 
until the satellite has returned to its box. 
A Missed Maneuver during a CA LIPSOKloudSat Coordinated Drag Make-up Maneuver 
To satisfy their formation flying requirements, CALIPSO and CloudSat coordinate their 
drag make-up maneuvers and execute them almost concurrently. Coordination details 
are contained in the CALIPSO/CloudSat ICD. A CALIPSO drag make-up maneuver 
consists of two burns separated by approximately one and a half orbits. The first burn is 
always planned to be outside ground station contact, although this is not a requirement. 
An S-Band ground contact will occur one orbit after the second burn. Maneuver 
notification will be available at this time via email and fax. One orbit later, a second 
ground contact is scheduled. After this pass, the updated ephemeris will be available 
for distribution to CCS and to CloudSat. 
If CALIPSO fails to execute either of its planned burns in its drag make-up maneuver 
and CloudSat executes its maneuver as planned, CloudSat will be on a post-maneuver 
trajectory relative to CALIPSO that will result in an undesired close approach, typically 
in two days, unless CloudSat promptly executes an “undo” maneuver. An undo 
maneuver cancels the effect of CloudSat‘s drag make-up maneuver arresting its motion 
toward CALIPSO and preventing a close approach between CloudSat and CALIPSO. 
If CloudSat fails to execute its corresponding drag make-up maneuver, it will break 
formation with CALIPSO, but will not immediately endanger CALIPSO or any other 
Constellation satellite. Table 2 is a high-level timeline of the coordination expected for 
this scenario. 
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Table 2: CloudSat and CALIPSO Coordination 
CALIPSO Burn 1 
CloudSat Burn 
CALIPSO Burn 2 
CALIPSO ground contact 
FAX 
Notification of success or failure to CloudSat by email and 
Operational Coordination Group telecon* 
CALIPSO ground contact 2 
CALIPSO Orbit products to CloudSat 
CS Undo Automatic Burn** 
0 I 0.0 
<Between CALIPSO Burn 1 and Burn 
2> 
150 2.5 
250 4.2 
260 ’ 4.3 
265 4.4 
350 5.8 
41 0 6.8 
CApprox. 12 hours after CloudSat Burn> 
* Members of Constellation management and operations teams 
** Cancelled if the CALIPSO maneuver executes as planned 
CloudSat or CALIPSO Falling into a Safe-Hold during Ascent Phase 
The CloudSat and CALIPSO ascent plans are “independent, but coordinated”. They 
were designed for minimal interaction between the two mission teams under nominal 
conditions. If either satellite falls into safehold during early orbit operations prior to 
entering the AC, the other satellite team plans to proceed with its own ascent plan and 
join the constellation according to its original schedule. While the complexity of the 
possible scenarios involving the ascents is not addressed in this paper, the general plan 
is discussed below. 
If CloudSat falls into Safe-hold, the CALIPSO team plans to perform its ascent 
maneuvers according to schedule and place its satellite in its Control Box. 
If CALIPSO falls into Safe-hold, the CloudSat team plans to perform its ascent 
maneuvers according to schedule and enter the AC. It will not be able to fly in 
formation until CALIPSO joins the constellation. Under these circumstances, 
CloudSat would take up a position 20 seconds along-track behind Aqua’s Control 
Box and would basically station keep at that this position until CALIPSO succeeded 
in achieving its box. If CALIPSO cannot reach its Control Box, the CloudSat team 
will need to recommend their planned approach for flying the constellation without 
CALIPSO. 
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Predicted Close Approach with Space Debris 
The possibility of collision with space debris is increasing all the time. A collision could 
disable an AC satellite and the resulting debris field could threaten all member satellites. 
AC satellites need to be prepared to perform evasive maneuvers if a credible risk of 
collision is identified. The process and procedures for handling this type of contingency 
are still in the development stage; the information below summarizes the activities to 
date. 
The NASA ESMO Office has taken the lead role in researching the options available to 
predict close approaches with space debris. This has developed as a joint effort with 
the United States STRATegic COMmand (USSTRATCOM) operated by the U.S. Air 
Force (USAF). Routine monitoring has already begun for the on-orbit missions, with 
USSTFWTCOM providing close approach predictions on a periodic basis to the ESMO 
Office. The CloudSat mission team plans to use the debris avoidance predictions 
available from the USAF through Kirtland Air Force Base, where the CloudSat Control 
Center resides. 
Predicted close approaches are typically identified several days in advance, but these 
initial predictions do not have the precision needed to make evasive maneuver 
decisions. As the date of the predicted close approach nears, the precision usually 
increases and mission teams can make decisions about evasive maneuvers. 
CCS Unavailable For an Extended Period 
If CCS is unavailable for more than a few days, there are two impacts: 
Alternate measures must be taken to ensure that constellation satellites are safe 
from close approaches 
0 Backup means must be applied to transfer and convert Constellation data 
products. 
Each satellite team knows whether their satellite is within its Control Box. As long as all 
satellites remain so, there is no short-term threat of a close approach. It is only during a 
predicted or actual Control Box excursion that a CCS substitute must be activated. 
Control box and close approach analysis can be performed manually by the satellite 
teams and/or by the ESMO Constellation team. Notifications will occur via manual e- 
mail and telephone. Product exchanges are expected to occur through manual 
processing by each satellite team using ftp or e-mail to transfer the data. 
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SUMMARY 
To reduce the possibility of constellation-wide contingency situations which could affect 
all the Afternoon Constellation satellites, general contingency procedures have been 
developed, based on the most likely and most constellation-impacting scenarios defined 
by the AC group. The described procedures provide general guidelines for the process 
of successful resolution of the contingencies. Further analysis is needed for 
contingencies related to debris avoidance as well AC contingencies which could impact 
the Earth Science Morning Constellation. 
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